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Summary
This thesis studies the impact of the Internet on the newspaper industry with special emphasis on 
quality.
In pursuing this, I apply a model by Armstrong and Weeds (2007) where I compare the 
equilibrium outcomes when the competing newspapers are characterized by a mixed funding regime 
(e.g., printed newspapers) versus a pure advertising funding regime (online newspapers). Because 
costly investment in higher quality can be translated into higher prices to the consumer in the mixed 
funding regime, whereas this is not possible in a pure advertising regime, quality will, in this 
modelling environment, be higher for printed newspapers than for online newspapers. On the other 
hand, online newspapers will respond to more fierce competition by increasing quality, while printed 
newspapers will reduce price and keep quality unchanged.
However, there are several limitations to the model. Perhaps most importantly, due to 
different reading behavior for online news relative to printed newspapers, online advertising has 
proven less effective compared to its printed counterpart. Hence, advertising revenues per reader is 
lower in online newspapers than in printed newspapers. Since the gain in advertising revenues by 
attracting more readers following an increase in quality is small, online newspapers will have 
weaker incentives to invest in costly quality.
I also investigate how news diversity may be affected by going from a mixed funding regime 
to a pure advertising regime. It is clear that for a fixed quality level, online newspapers will have 
incentives to differentiate themselves minimally from their competitors. Printed newspaper (mixed 
funding) on the other hand will differentiate themselves to a larger degree as differentiation allows 
for setting higher prices. However, changing the assumptions, such as endogenous quality and 
allowing for more newspapers, may give different results.
The main conclusion of this thesis is that news quality, measured as costly news production 
(e.g., ratio of self-produced content, use of multiple sources, investigative journalism), is lower 
online than in printed newspapers. An implication of this may be a reduction in positive externalities 
provided by quality news production.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the newspaper industry has been struggling. The circulation of printed newspapers 
has decreased substantially, and free online news outlets have become increasingly popular. In the 
U.S., several newspapers have been closed down, and in Norway the major newspaper companies 
have experienced cut-backs and lay-offs of journalists. In most countries, newspaper publishers are 
faced with declining advertising revenues and reductions in circulation and news titles.1
The newspaper industry is undergoing a transition amplified by the Internet. As more readers 
migrate online, sales of printed newspapers are declining, which means lower revenues from both 
sales and advertising. Because online advertising has proved less effective, newspapers are having a 
difficult time compensating for the lost revenues in the printed market online. Quality news content 
is a source of positive externalities which has proven to be vital in a working democracy. One of the 
main concerns is that the recent development in the newspaper industry may compromise the 
newspapers' ability to deliver high-quality, diversified news content. 
In this thesis I study the impact of the Internet on the newspaper industry with special 
emphasis on quality, with the Norwegian and the U.S. industry as examples. In pursuing these 
issues, I use a model by Armstrong and Weeds (2007) where printed newspapers are located on a 
Hotelling line and are funded with a mix of sales revenues and advertising revenues, and online 
newspapers are funded solely by revenues from advertising. Readers' preferences depend on 
newspaper prices, the amount of advertising, and quality, where quality is assumed costly to 
produce. It is shown that in the case of printed newspapers, the quality level and the amount of 
advertising coincide with the socially optimal outcome, whereas online news outlets tend to have too 
low quality and too much advertising. In the eyes of the consumers, it is uncertain what regime is 
preferred as there is a trade-off between prices, quality, and the amount of advertising. Moreover, the 
model suggests that increased competition leads to increased quality online, whereas for printed 
newspapers, quality is unaffected, but will lead to a price reduction.
Based on the theoretical analysis and a discussion based on facts and other literature, I find 
that news quality is primarily affected through two channels when going online: (1) As the 
newspapers usually are not able to charge readers for content online, it becomes difficult to extract 
readers' surplus by increasing the price following an increase in quality, and (2) online reading 
1 OECD (2010), p. 6.
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behavior differs from offline reading behavior which affects both the newspapers' incentives towards 
news production as well as the value of advertising spaces.
Furthermore, the newspaper's incentives towards differentiation may differ in a purely 
advertising based business model (online news) relative to the traditional mixed funding regime. As 
price competition disappears online, newspapers may have incentives to choose minimal 
differentiation from competing news outlets. However, as there usually exist a larger number of 
news providers online, it can be argued that diversity in fact may increase. Moreover, as low 
differentiation may lead to more fierce competition in terms of quality, it can be argued that there 
exists a trade-off between quality and diversity for online news. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: In part 2, I present a short introduction to the 
rise of newspaper publishing and the newspaper business model, and the importance of quality news 
content. Further, I will describe the main features of the development of the newspaper industry in 
the U.S. and in Norway and how the industry in these two countries has been affected by the recent 
market turnover. Moreover, I discuss the impact of Internet and its implications for quality, 
especially of online content. The theoretical model is introduced in part 3. Limitations, possible 
extensions and a potential trade-off between quality and diversity online are discussed in part 4. Part 
5 concludes the thesis. 
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2. The newspaper industry and the role of newspapers
2.1. Rise of newspaper publishing and the newspaper business model
The history of newspaper publishing is characterized by a close interaction between technological 
and social changes. The invention of modern printing technology which presented the opportunity 
for mass-production of written material,2 social changes during the 18th century such as rising 
literacy and a growing middle-class, and the development of a postal system, laid the foundation for 
the growth of the newspaper industry.3 
Traditionally, there have been three sources of income for the newspaper industry: 
subscription revenues, income from newspaper stands, and advertising revenues. Thus, newspapers 
serve two distinctive groups, readers and advertisers, where newspapers act as an intermediary 
between these two groups. Information and news content is delivered to the readers, and the readers' 
attention is sold to the advertisers, who would like to reach as many potential costumers as possible. 
It is therefore often said that newspapers act as a “platform” in a two-sided market, with readers on 
one side of the market and advertisers on the other. In the last few years there has been an increase 
in the literature on two-sided markets and its implications for pricing. In a two-sided market the 
pricing on each side of the market depends not only on the demand elasticities and marginal costs on 
the corresponding side of the market, but on the joint set of demand elasticities and marginal costs 
(see e.g. Rysman (2009) for a nice introduction to pricing mechanisms in two-sided markets). The 
platform might set a price that is below marginal cost to one of the groups if this side is relatively 
more price elastic and their participation attracts a great number of participants on the other side, 
who are relatively price inelastic, and therefore have a higher mark-up. 
Applied to the newspaper market, low newspaper prices attract readers, which leads to higher 
participation and higher prices for the advertisers, who are on the other side of the market. The 
increased value on the advertising side of the market increases the value of having more readers, 
which leads to a bigger decrease in the price on newspapers. In many instances, the revenues from 
the reader side of the market are not enough to cover the costs of content production, printing and 
distribution, and so revenues from the advertising side are used to fund the newspaper and its 
2 “History of publishing”, Brittannica: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/482597/history-of-publishing, 
accessed March 30, 2012. 
3 OECD (2010), p. 15.
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content. Hence, in many cases the newspaper business model is characterized by advertising 
revenues cross-subsidizing news production, printing, and distribution.
I will now turn to a short introduction of the newspaper industry in the U.S. and in Norway. 
The development of the newspaper industry in the two countries bear similarities, however there are 
some distinct differences between those two, especially when it comes to the position of 
newspapers, reading habits, and government support. Because of these differences, the digital 
revolution may have different industry effects in the U.S. and in Norway. 
2.2. The U.S. newspaper industry 
Prior to the 20th century, most American newspapers were family-owned and served quite small 
audiences of about 15-20%, depending on geography, literacy, and economic development.4 The 
audience the newspapers served often represented the politically and economically viable citizens of 
the community.5 Subscription prices were usually high, but affordable by the core audience, who 
mostly funded the newspapers and its content.
The heavily advertising funded newspaper business model of American newspapers 
developed alongside the Industrial Revolution, urbanization, expanded literacy among the 
population, and the creation of the penny press (inexpensive papers sold by street vendors).6 Lower 
newspaper prices increased the newspapers' readership, but did not offset the cost of producing 
content and distributing the paper. However, because advertisers' value of ad spaces are increasing in 
the number of readers, the loss in revenues from papers sold was offset by increasing advertising 
revenues. The resulting advertising revenues made it possible for the newspapers to keep the price 
on their newspaper down and to invest in newspaper content, which increased the quality of the 
paper and therefore attracted even more readers and advertisers.7 
From the 1950s to around 2000, the U.S. newspaper industry was a high-margin, profitable 
industry. In 1983, the total circulation of daily newspapers in the U.S. reached its maximum at 63.3 
4 Picard (2004), p. 58. All the numbers in section 2.2. and its connected subsections are taken from Picard (2004), if 
not stated otherwise.
5 Ibid., p. 58.
6 Kirchhoff (2009), p. 2.
7 Park (2010), p. 372; “Reinventing the Newspaper”, The Economist, July 7, 2011: 
http://www.economist.com/node/18904178, accessed February 5, 2012.
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million spread among 1,701 newspapers,8 and in 2000, profits peaked at 22.7%.9 Compared to other 
industries, the newspaper industry has been doing extremely well, and at some point even surpassed 
the pharmaceutical industry, the metal industry, the aircraft industry, the auto industry, department 
stores, and grocery stores in terms of profits.10 The success of the newspaper industry in terms of 
profits is attributed to several changes in the market conditions facing the newspapers after the 
Second World War. I will come to this in the next section.
2.2.1. The upswing
In 1952, the total number of daily newspapers reached its peak at 1,786.11 In 1983, this number had 
fallen to 1,701, and in 2000, the number was down to 1,480 dailies.12 The bankruptcy of several 
secondary newspapers from the mid-20th century,13 coupled with the expansion in the advertising 
industry after the Second World War, benefited the remaining newspapers as they often became the 
sole newspaper in the relevant market and therefore one of the biggest beneficiary of the growing 
demand for advertising spaces.14 The majority of newspapers were therefore local monopolies, and 
the newspapers were able to raise the circulation price 30-40% above the previous levels, and 
increase the rates for advertising about 20-30%. This led to a steady growth in advertising revenues 
for the newspaper industry. 
The industry's dependence on advertising increased in the second half of the 20th century, 
from 71% of total industry revenues stemming from advertising in 1956 to 82% in 2000. In 1950, 
the bulk of the advertising revenues to the industry came from retail advertising (advertising that 
promotes local companies' and merchandisers' goods and services), at around 57%. The two other 
categories of advertisement, national (advertising for companies that have a nationwide target) and 
classifieds (brief advertisement appearing alongside with other ads of the same type, i.e. real estate 
ads, automobile ads, employment ads), accounted for around 25% and 18%, respectively. As the 
television sets started to enter American homes after the Second World War, the composition of the 
advertising categories making up for industry revenues started to change. The importance of retail 
8 Picard (2002), p. 16.
9 Kirchhoff (2009), p. 4.
10 Picard (2004), p. 56.
11 Picard (2002), p. 16.
12 Ibid., p. 16.
13 Secondary newspapers are papers that are the second largest at their places of publication. 
14 Picard (2004), p. 56.
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advertising started to diminish as more national advertisers would rather display their 
advertisements on broadcast television to reach a larger share of the population at the same time. In 
2000, retail advertising and classifieds accounted for 44% and 40%, respectively, while national 
advertising only accounted for 16%. 
With the introduction of television, local newspapers lost ground in terms of national 
advertising, but because there were limited options for local advertising and classifieds, the local 
newspapers still enjoyed some market power in its respective local area and were able to maintain 
their profits by continuing to charge high prices to the advertisers.
The increased profitability of newspapers during the second half of the 20th century made it 
possible for some newspaper owners to form newspaper groups. An industry that was characterized 
by small, family-owned newspapers, soon became an industry dominated by large media 
conglomerates.15 In the years between 1960 and 1980, 57 newspapers were sold to the Gannett  
Company, and by 1977, 170 newspaper groups owned two-thirds of U.S. daily newspapers.16 
2.2.2. The downturn
The last decade has been devastating for the U.S. newspaper industry. Reports about declining 
readership, circulation and advertising revenues have led to gloomy predictions about the survival of 
the printed newspaper industry by media observers and newspaper editors.17 According to the annual 
report on U.S. journalism undertaken by the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in 
Journalism (2011), total advertising revenues to the newspaper industry had fallen to $22.8 billion in 
2010, accounting for a decline of 53% in a decade (advertising revenues peaked in 2000 at $48.7 
billion). The evolution of advertising revenues from 1985 to 2000 is shown in figure 1. In 2010, 
profit margins for a typical newspaper were around 5% (which is less than a quarter compared to 
profits in 2000).18
The newspaper industry's increased dependency on classified advertising in the second half 
of the 20th century made the industry highly profitable, but also more sensitive to economic changes 
15 Neiva (1995), p. 22.
16 Kirchhoff (2009), p. 3.
17 “Out Of Print: The death and life of the American Newspaper, The New Yorker, March 31, 2008: 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/03/31/080331fa_fact_alterman, accessed February 28, 2012; “Top 
business-news execs express pessimism about newspapers, print”, Reynolds Center, October 13, 2011: 
http://businessjournalism.org/2011/10/13/top-business-news-execs-express-pessimism-about-newspapers-print/, 
accessed February 28, 2012.
18 Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011). 
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because classified advertising tends to be more cyclical and volatile to changes in the economic 
environment compared to brand advertising.19 Much of the decline in advertising expenditures can 
be attributed to sharp drops in classified advertising due to the recession in the early 2000s and the 
financial crisis in 2008, and to the shift of advertisers to digital platforms.20 The development in 
classified advertising revenues is seen in figure 2.  
Circulation revenues have also been declining, although not at the same rate as advertising 
revenues.21 Unlike the new trend of declining advertising revenues the last decade, circulation 
revenues have not grown since the 1980s.22 This may be due to the increase in competition for 
audiences facing the industry from radio and television, or changes in social, political, or cultural 
factors. 
In 2009, a total of seven newspaper companies went bankrupt, including The Tribune 
Company, the nation's second-largest newspaper publisher.23 A report by the USC Annenberg Center 
for the Digital Future (2012) predicts the death of most American newspapers within about five 
years.
19 Picard (2002), p. 26.
20 Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2009).
21 Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011).
22 Picard (2002), pp. 14-15.
23 Kirchhoff (2009), pp. 7-8.
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Figure 1: Daily advertising revenues for U.S. newspapers, 1985-2010 (in billions of USD)
Source: Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011)
Figure 2: Total classified print advertising revenues for U.S. newspapers, 2000-2010 (in  
billions of USD)
Source: Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011)
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2.3. The Norwegian newspaper industry
The Industrial Revolution, the decline in illiteracy, and the growth of political parties and interest in 
politics, all laid the foundation for the growth of the Norwegian newspaper industry. Historically, the 
Norwegian newspaper industry consisted of small, family-run newspapers, and most newspapers 
were affiliated with a political party. The rise of the partisan press was a natural consequence of the 
establishment of the political parties during the 1880s and onwards.24 Typically, most cities had two 
or three partisan papers competing against each other,25 and newspaper editors and journalists were 
for most parts politically active and used their paper to “promote” their respective parties' opinions 
and policies.26 From the mid-1960s, the political ties were gradually loosened. From 1966 to 1990, 
the share of newspapers affiliated with a political party decreased from 64% to 32%.27 
2.3.1. Newspaper deaths and the introduction of press subsidies
From the early 1950s to the early 1970s, the Norwegian newspaper industry experienced a declining 
interest in news, and the period was characterized by a reduction in newspaper consumption and 
decline in the number of secondary newspapers. In 1952, there were 42 seconday papers, and by 
1972, this number had been reduced to 30.28 The Norwegian Press Subsidy was introduced in 1969 
to prevent newspaper deaths (which had occurred in Denmark and Sweden) and monopolization in 
the newspaper market, and in that way maintain a differentiated Norwegian press.29 The press 
subsidies also made the Norwegian industry less dependent on advertising revenues compared to the 
U.S. industry.30 
24 The first Norwegian political party was Venstre, which was established January 28, 1884.
25 Høst (1999), p. 115.
26 NOU (2010: 14), p. 55.
27 Ibid., p. 55.
28 Høst (1999), p. 115.
29 Skogerbø (1997), p. 102; Høst (1999), p. 118; NOU (2010: 14), p. 29.
30 I did not find concrete numbers on the Norwegian industry's dependence on advertising revenues. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the Norwegian industry is quite similar to the other Nordic industries. According to a 
report by OECD (2009), in 2008, advertising revenues contributed to 87% of the revenues in America, while the 
number was 54%, 53% and 38% in Finland, Sweden and Denmark, respectively.
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2.3.2. “The Golden Age” and the downturn
The decline of the 1950s and 60s was followed by an expansion from the 1970s to about 1994. 
Especially the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by a rapid growth in the newspaper market, by 
some known as “the golden age” of newspapers.31 Between 1972 and 1997, the number of 
newspapers increased from 199 to 221.32 Furthermore, the Norwegian newspaper industry 
experienced a change in the concentration of ownership in the early 1980s, and as of today, three 
media groups or conglomerates dominate the Norwegian newspaper industry; Schibsted (owns, 
among others, Aftenposten and Verdens Gang, two of Norway's largest newspapers,), A-
Pressen,33and Polaris Media. 
However, similarly to the experience of U.S. newspapers, Norwegian newspapers are 
experiencing tougher market conditions, and Norwegian media scholars have expressed concerns 
about the future of the Norwegian newspaper industry.34 From 2005, there was a clear trend of 
declining news consumption and circulation, but most importantly of advertising revenues.35 
Newspaper advertising revenues reached its peak in 2007. In 2009, ad revenues had shrunk by 23%.
36 As a response to the economic difficulties, the Norwegian newspaper industry has downsized its 
workforce, especially of journalists. Between 1997 and 2006, the number of employed in the 
newspaper industry declined by 53%.37 
Newspapers that are only sold as single-copies have especially taken a hit in the industry 
turmoil. According to the Norwegian Media Businesses' Association (in Norwegian: 
Mediebedriftenes Landsforening (MBL)), single-copy newspaper circulation declined by 6.7% in 
2011, while the number of subscribers declined by 2.3%. During the last decade, the two largest 
single-copy newspapers, Verdens Gang (VG) and Dagbladet, have accounted for about 45% of the 
total decline in circulation.38 Figure 3 shows the decline in readership for some of the largest 
31 Wilberg (2009), p. 30.
32  Høst (1999), p. 117.
33 In 2011, A-Pressen bought the Norwegian media group Edda Media. The acquisition is currently being evaluated and 
treated by the Norwegian Media Authority (“Medietilsynet”), and the matter will be finalized in May/June, 2012.
34 “Kraftig lut til tøffe tider”, Aftenposten, February 11, 2010: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/article2918730.ece#.T28r8TFmJm1, accessed February 28, 2012; 
“Frykter tabloid-død”, Forskning.no, June 24, 2009: http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2009/juni/223542, accessed 
March 1, 2012.
35 Høst (2011), p. 34.
36 Ibid., p. 5.
37 OECD (2010), p. 20. Between 1997-2007, employment in the U.S. decreased by 12%.
38 “Opplaget 2011: Nett og mobil vokser – Fortsatt svikt på papir”, Mediebedriftenes Landsforening: 
http://www.mediebedriftene.no/index.asp?id=114050, accessed March 16, 2012. 
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newspapers in Norway.
 The relatively strong position of subscribed newspapers may be attributed to the reading 
behavior in Norway. Until 2004, Norway had the highest per (adult) capita newspaper reach 
worldwide,39 and in 2009, Norway had a daily newspaper reach40 of 82% compared to 45% in the 
U.S.41 In 2007, seven in ten household in Norway had a subscription of at least one newspaper, 
where about 64% subscribed in the big cities and 75% in the more scarcely populated areas.42 
Moreover, local newspapers are still popular in Norway. The majority of the rural population 
in Norway has “always” lived there. This is closely related to strong political will in Norway to 
preserve the Norwegian cultural landscape and to create and uphold regional policies meant to 
preserve the main features of the traditional residential pattern. The local paper is therefore often 
regarded as a very important part of the community.43 In the U.S., on the other hand, migration 
patterns are highly different, with the average American moving 11.7 times in a lifetime.44 For that 
reason, Norwegians are more strongly linked to their local newspaper, which may partly explain the 
less severe decline in subscribers, as most local newspapers are mainly sold by paid subscription45. 
What might be a surprising trend of the last couple of years is the increase in the circulation 
of niche newspapers. The leftist newspaper Klassekampen reached a personal circulation revenues 
record in 2010, after eleven years of rising circulation figures.46 The same trend is also seen for some 
of the niche weeklies (e.g. Morgenbladet and Dag og Tid). After two years of gloomy outlooks, total 
industry advertising revenues actually increased in 2011, which has brought a slight optimism to the 
Norwegian newspapers industry.47
The economic difficulties of the newspaper industry, both in the U.S. and in Norway, has 
been amplified by the digital revolution since much of the decline in readership and advertising 
revenues can be explained by the migration of readers to digital news platforms and the limited 
success of online advertising for the news outlets. One of the biggest concerns is that the economic 
difficulties experienced by the newspaper industry will affect the quality and diversity of the content 
39 Bruns and Himmler (2011), p. 8.
40 All adults claiming to have read a newspaper recently/the day before.
41 OECD (2010), p. 29.
42 Bruns and Himmler (2011), p. 8.
43 Høst (1999), p. 123.
44 “Population Profile of the United States”, U.S. Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-
profile/geomob.html, accessed March 23, 2012.
45 Høst (1999), p. 114.
46 Høst (2011), p. 7.
47 Høst (2011), p. 5.
11
supplied by newspapers.48 In the next section I will define quality and explain why quality news 
content is important to preserve.
Figure 3: Circulation numbers for four of the largest regional  
newspapers, 1980-2011 (1989-2011 for Aftenposten Aften) – VG 
and Dagbladet are only sold as single-copies
Source: Norwegian Media Businesses' Association (MBL) 
Figure 4: Circulation numbers for three niche newspapers, 1980-
2011
Source: Norwegian Media Businesses' Association (MBL)
48 OECD (2010), p. 12. 
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2.4. The importance of quality journalism
Defining quality of news content is a quite subjective matter, however there is a high degree of 
consensus among scholars (see e.g. Picard (2004); Zaller (2003)) that quality journalism should be 
of social, cultural or political significance, e.g. news content that ensures the role of newspapers as 
“watchdogs” over government and as promoters of participatory democracy. According to Picard 
(2004), research has shown that amongst newspaper editors, the higher ratio of self-produced 
content to purchased material, the higher ratio of editorial material to advertising, and coverage of 
local news are all seen as important factors in quality journalism because it secures a higher degree 
of accuracy and diversity of the opinions expressed in the media, which helps the newspapers to 
fulfill their roles in a democracy. In addition, it has been argued that the use of multiple sources 
helps provide accuracy, representativeness and broadness in the coverage of an issue, in addition to 
eliminating biases which may occur when one source is chosen over another.49 The use of multiple 
sources has also been stated in the Ethical Code of Practice for the Norwegian Press (in Norwegian: 
Vær Varsom-plakaten), which was adapted in 1936 by the Norwegian Press Association (in 
Norwegian: Norsk Presseforbund). In this section I will explain how quality journalism may have 
positive effects on the society as a whole through positive externalities to the readers and between 
newspapers.
It is an universal agreement that an open and well-functioning press is crucial in order to 
preserve freedom of expression and speech, and for democracy to work effectively. Modern society 
is characterized by an overwhelming mass of information, and in order for citizens to understand 
and respond to the world of public affairs, they need an intermediary that can interpret and make 
politics and public policies understandable for the citizens that it affects. Newspapers have the 
ability to put important issues on the agenda, and one of the most important roles of current 
newspapers is to sort, simplify, and present relevant information in a way that is understandable for 
common people.50 In this regard, journalism can be interpreted as a type of research which foster 
knowledge and information for ordinary citizens that do not have the time or capacity to acquire 
knowledge and information for themselves. Thus, newspapers help to inform and update the 
citizens, which increases human capital and assists democracy to work more effectively because 
informed citizens make better decisions, not only for themselves, but also for their children and in 
49 Carpenter (2008), p. 6.
50 NOU (2010: 14), p. 54. 
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political elections.51 By making information available and understandable for ordinary citizens, 
newspapers and the press help the citizens to become active participants in the democracy. A vital 
prerequisite for the press to fulfill this role is to ensure that the newspapers deliver content of high 
quality and that the press is diversified. This is important in order for the newspapers to bring 
trustworthy and accurate information to all groups of society, and in order to give all the members of 
society a voice.52 One of the main goals of the Norwegian media policy is to promote quality and 
diversity in the national media.53
A free and open press is also is an imperative shield against abuses of power and important to 
ensure that the government represents its people and can be held accountable by its citizens. The 
press has therefore often been referred to as a watchdog over government. An alert, thorough, and 
critical press is crucial in all countries to prevent careless and unethical behavior of government 
officials, crime and corruption, and it is an essential check on both government and businesses to 
help provide more effective allocation of resources in the public sector. There are several instances 
where investigative journalism has contributed to the exposure of misuse of power, imprudence, or 
even illegal behavior among politicians or corporations. In 2001, two journalists from the Wall  
Street Journal uncovered the Enron scandal in the United States. In 2005, three journalists from 
Aftenposten reported that the CEO for two Norwegian public companies, Nedre Romerrike Vannverk 
AS (a pumping station), and AS Sentralrenseanlegget RA-2 (a sewage treatment plant), had through 
his son's private company funneled over 100 million NOK from these two public companies into his 
own private accounts. 
The role of newspapers as watchdogs is especially important in a country like Norway, where 
around 50% of the national product is directed by the public sector and where the state manages the 
Government Pension Fund – Global (in Norwegian: Statens Pensjonsfond utland), or more 
commonly known as The Oil Fund, worth more than 3000 billion NOK,54 and the Government 
Pension Fund – Norway (in Norwegian: Statens Pensjonsfond innland). 
 In addition to the political importance of newspapers, newspapers are also important in a 
social and cultural way. Reading news may be seen as a social glue; sharing and discussing news 
binds people together. In addition, news reading improves writing and language skills, and is 
51 Kind and Møen (2011), p. 4.
52 NOU (2010: 14), p. 18; Carpenter (2010), pp. 1064-1065.
53 NOU (2010: 14), p. 18.
54 “Oljefondet har passert 3000 milliarder kroner”, Aftenposten, October 12, 2011: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/innland/article3863210.ece#.T2Cd3TEaNm0, accessed March 18, 2012.
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therefore important to maintain and strengthen national identity and culture.
Newspapers can play an important role in democracy and be of great social and cultural 
importance. It can thus be argued that quality journalism provides benefits that go beyond the 
private benefit of the newspapers, advertisers, and the readers, who are the direct beneficiaries of 
news production, in the sense that it benefits the society as a whole. We therefore say that journalists 
and newspapers that supply quality journalism are sources of positive externalities. 
News production does not only provide positive externalities to the citizens, but also to other 
newspapers. News content is an information good and is characterized by high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs, i.e., news content is costly to produce, but cheap to reproduce. When news articles 
are published, the content is relatively easy to copy or to be used in the (re)production of articles in 
competing newspapers. In the eyes of the original producer, this provides disincentives for resource-
demanding news production (in terms of time, wage and effort) because the producer of the original 
article does not necessarily reap all the benefits of the news production in terms of the number of 
unique readers (the number of different people reading an article) and advertising revenues. For the 
competing newspaper, however, this is beneficial as it can now save time and money on research. 
This may be beneficial from a social stance, because as competing newspapers cover the same topic 
with different angles, there is a more diversified representation of the original story.55
The Norwegian press subsidies are rationalized to preserve diversity and as a result to protect 
democracy and freedom of speech, stimulate political and social debate, and to uphold the 
Norwegian language and culture.56 However, to justify the use of subsidies from an economic point 
of view we have to determine whether the market is able to provide the optimal amount of news 
articles or the optimal level of quality. If not, this may justify the use of subsidies by the Norwegian 
government to the newspaper industry. 
The existence of positive externalities is one of the main reasons why the market may not be 
able to provide the optimal level of quality journalism. The newspapers do not internalize the social 
and political benefits of their news production, only the private benefits (i.e., their own profits). The 
positive impact the newspapers have on democracy can not be capitalized by the newspapers 
because the benefits of “a more democratic” or more efficient society do not directly accrue to the 
newspapers. The positive impact the newspapers have on each other when they decide to run a story 
are not being taken into account because the recipients of the positive externalities do not have to 
55 Kind and Møen (2011), p. 3.
56 NOU (2010: 14), chapter 3.
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pay for it. Thus, goods that generate positive externalities are often underproduced because the 
monetary incentives to produce the socially optimal levels of quality are too low.57 Hence, to 
encourage a higher production of quality news, the use of press subsidies by the Norwegian 
government may be justified. 
Because of the important role of newspapers, possible measures and policies to help the 
newspaper industry and maintaining the quality of news are being discussed both in Norway and in 
the U.S. In 2009, the “Newspaper Revitalization Act of 2009” was introduced in the U.S. congress 
which would allow some newspapers to be treated as non-profit organizations and therefore be 
exempted from taxes.58 However, stronger political intervention in the newspaper industry has little 
political support in the U.S. as many see this as a threat to the independence of newspapers.59 In 
Norway, the Ministry of Culture suggested in 2012 that the subsidy system should be extended to 
online news providers in order to promote innovation and development of the digital news products 
in Norway, and to promote diversity in the newspaper industry.60
In the following sections I investigate how the digital era has changed the economic 
foundation of the news industry and how the Internet may negatively affect the incentives for 
production of high-quality content, especially online, and examine possible consequences of 
negative changes in quality. 
2.5. The impact of Internet
The mass media have undergone tremendous changes after the introduction of the Internet and the 
rise of broadband usage, especially in the industrial world. Information and content, which was 
mainly created by professionals and distributed by large media companies, are now created, copied, 
and disseminated by several actors in the virtual community.  The Internet has driven the cost of 
sharing information down to zero, making it possible for practically anyone with an Internet 
connection to share thoughts, opinions, videos, and information.
Between 1995 and 2010, the usage of Internet by adults (18+) in the U.S. increased 
57 In section 4.4.2, I give the formal economic definition of social optimum, and look at the outcomes in the printed 
newspaper market and the digital newspaper market in comparison to the social optimum.
58 OECD (2010), p. 69.
59 Kirchhoff (2009), p. 2.
60 “Nett skal bety like mye som papir”, Dagbladet, March 29, 2012: 
http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/03/29/kultur/pressestotte/moms/medier/mediestotteutvalget/20894769/, accessed 
April 11, 2012. 
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dramatically, from about 15%  around 74%, according to the Pew Internet and American Life 
Project (2010). The same study shows that broadband use at home increased from 5% in 2000 to 
60% in 2010. A similar pattern emerged in Norway. From 1997 to 2010, the share of the Norwegian 
population with access to Internet increased from 13% to 93%, and the share of the population with 
access to broadband increased from 29% to 84% in the period between 2005 and 2010.61  
As more people have access to a faster Internet, the consumption patterns of information and 
entertainment change dramatically, especially among the younger segments of the population. 
Instead of watching their favorite show on television or buying an album in the local record store, 
many choose to stream or download TV shows and music from the web instead. 
News has become easily available on online news outlets, news aggregators, and blogs, and 
an increasing share of the population get their news from online outlets instead of from a printed 
newspaper. In 2001, only 13% of Americans got most of their national and international news from 
the Internet, while 45% got it from printed newspapers.62 By 2008, the Internet outdid printed 
newspapers as the primary source of news, with 40% getting most of their national and international 
news from the Internet, compared to 35% getting it from printed newspapers. The Annual Internet 
Survey by the USC Annenberg Center for the Digital Future (2008) showed that around 22% of the 
readers dropped their subscription on printed newspapers because they could find related content for 
free online. In 2005/06, 36% of a Norwegian sample stated that the Internet was their most 
important source for news, compared to 48% stating printed newspapers as the most important news 
source. In 2010, these numbers were 54% and 39%, respectively.63 
A great concern for today's newspaper executives is how to compensate for the lost revenues 
in the printed newspaper market. Online newspapers are becoming increasingly popular, however 
the digital news outlets are struggling to capitalize on the increased popularity. One reason for this is 
that the market conditions facing online news providers are very different from the market 
conditions facing printed newspapers, which may influence the value of advertising spaces and thus 
the income from advertising on online news outlets. I will turn to these issues in the next sections.
61 MedieNorge and Norsk Mediebarometer 2010.
62 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2010).
63 MedieNorge and TNS Gallup.
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Figure 5: American Internet Usage (Adults) – Percentage
Source: Pew Internet and American Life Project (2010)
Figure 6: American Broadband Usage (Adults) – Percentage
Source: Pew Internet and American Life Project (2010)
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Figure 7: Share of Norwegian population with access to Internet (1997-
2009) and share with access to broadband (2004-2009)
Source: MedieNorge and Norsk mediebarometer
2.5.1. Market conditions for online news provision
The business model of online newspapers is not fundamentally different from the business model of 
its printed counterpart; to attract “eyeballs” and subsequently advertisers. The main distinction 
between printed newspapers and news offered online is the market conditions the news providers 
face online compared to in the print market. 
First of all, news consumption patterns have changed drastically after the introduction of the 
Internet. Most printed newspapers are not distributed for free, and most consumers buy a single copy 
of their favorite printed paper. The readers online have a very different behavior. Because most of 
the news online is free of charge and the search cost online is low, many consumers visit several 
news outlets when in search of news, a phenomenon known as multi-homing.
Moreover, readers spend far less time reading online news compared to news in a traditional 
newspapers. In the U.S., for example, online readers spend on average 53 minutes a week reading 
news on the Internet (around 8 minutes a day), while readers of printed newspapers spend on 
average 27 minutes a day (57 minutes on Sundays).64 The behavior of online readers is characterized 
as more sporadic compared to the behavior of readers of printed newspapers, and reader attention is 
more scattered online than offline.65 
64 Kirchhoff (2009), p. 11.
65 OECD (2010), p. 6.
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The competition facing the online news providers is very different from the competition 
facing printed newspapers. Many printed newspapers enjoy regional or local monopolies in the 
provision of news and information, but when entering the digital world, the same newspapers are 
faced with competition from a vast number of news outlets, websites, and bloggers. 
In addition to fierce competition for readers' attention, the newspapers are also faced with 
tougher competition on the advertising side of the market. This is especially the case for classified 
advertisers, who are leaving the newspaper market in favor of cheap and specialized websites such 
as Craigslist, Monster and Finn. 
2.5.2. Implications for online advertising revenues
In 1970, around 30% of total advertising expenditures went to the newspaper industry.66 As 
television and Internet started to enter the market for advertising, these media and outlets have 
started to eat away at the share of advertising expenditures going to the newspaper industry. Around 
2000, the share had dropped to about 20%.67 Traditionally, the advertisers have “payed” the 
newspapers in order to access a loyal and stable reader base with the proper demographics. This 
used to generate high profits for newspapers. The problem for news outlets online is that they are no 
longer able to guarantee a large and loyal reader base to the same degree as in the printed market. 
When the consumers are multi-homing online and the reader attention is scattered and limited, 
online news outlets do not appeal to the advertisers in the same way as printed newspapers. In 
addition, most major web browsers offer pop-up blockers and ad-filtering, giving more power to the 
readers and making advertising online even less attractive. According to a press release by the 
Internet marketing research company comScore, 31% of display ads are never seen by the users.68 
These factors affects the prices news outlets online are able to set for their advertising spaces.
Newspapers have become extremely popular in the digital age, but due to the difficult market 
conditions facing online news sites, they find it hard to capitalize on the increased popularity online. 
According to comScore, American newspaper websites attracted 66.6 million unique visitors (the 
number of different people visiting a website) in April 2008, compared to 86.4 million print readers 
66 Picard (2002), p. 9.
67 Ibid., p. 9.
68 “comScore Introduces Validated Campaign Essentials (vCE), a Holistic Measurement Solution That Validates 
Advertising Impressions and Audiences Reached with Digital Advertising Campaigns”, comScore, January 18, 2012: 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/1/comScore_Introduces_Validated_Campaign_Essenti
als, accessed February 28, 2012.
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the same month.69 However less than 10% of newspaper revenues were generated online,70 even 
though the share seems to be increasing both in the U.S. and in Norway.71
In section 2.4.1, I mentioned that readers spend less time reading news online compared to 
traditional newspapers. Figure 8 shows estimates of the average time spent for some selected 
websites in Norway and the U.S. The figure may in part help explaining why online advertising has 
proved less profitable for online newspapers compared to other advertising dependent online 
companies such as Google and Facebook. According to numbers from the Newspaper Association of 
America (NAA), total online newspaper revenues in 2011 were around 3.2 billion USD. The same 
year Google earned 36.5 billion USD while Facebook earned about the same as the total online 
revenues of all the members of the NAA.72 When the average user spends limited time on online 
news sites and have few pageviews within the site (e.g. article “clicks”), the likelihood of being 
“impressed” by advertising is likely to be much lower than what is the case for the average 
Facebook user, who spends much more time on the Facebook website.
The economic foundation for the newspaper industry and news production has 
fundamentally changed in wake of the digital era. In the printed market, the change is caused by the 
migration of readers to digital platforms. Newspaper companies have gone from a period of (mostly) 
continued growth to a time of falling readership, circulation, and advertising revenues. The problem 
online is that the news companies are struggling to capitalize on digital news because advertising 
has proved to be less effective online. 
69 “As Print Newspapers Decline, How Does Digital Fill the Void?”, comScore, July 23, 2009: 
http://blog.comscore.com/2009/07/print_newspapers_decline.html, accessed March 21, 2012. 
70 Kirchhoff (2009), p. 1.
71 Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2012); Høst (2011), p. 5.
72 “Google 2012 Financial Tables”, Google Investor Relations: http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html, 
accessed April 15, 2012; “United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Registration Statement, 
Facebook, Inc”, United States Securities and Exchange Commission: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm, accessed March 21, 2012. 
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Figure 8: Average time spent on site (in minutes) and the number of  
pageviews per user for some selected web sites
Source: Alexa: The Web Information Company
Figure 9: Composition of advertising revenues from printed  
newspapers and online newspapers in the United States (in millions)
Source: Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism 
(2012)
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Figure 10: Composition of offline and online revenues for four  
major newspaper companies in Norway (in millions NOK),
Source: Media Norge (M:NO)
2.5.3. Consequences for quality 
One of the most pressing concerns for the industry is that the revenues made on the digital news 
outlets are not enough to support the existing size and quality standards of the industry, and that the 
difficulties of the industry poses a threat to the newspapers' traditional roles as a reliable information 
source and as a check on businesses and government officials, especially online. The need for 
immediacy and the constant pressure for profitability may have adverse effects on the level of 
quality on the news supplied online. In the printed market, quality may be affected through lower 
revenues and cutbacks in staff. In 2010, 16% of U.S. newspaper executives responded that their staff 
“is too small to do more than the minimum level of reporting”.73
The importance of conserving “quality journalism” is highly connected with the special role 
journalism has in society, which I discussed in section 2.4. The digital era are posing threats to 
several industries, including the movie and music industry, but the vital role of newspapers and 
journalists makes journalism different from other media content, and the future of the newspaper 
industry in the wake of the digital revolution has become a public matter in several countries. In 
2009, President Obama expressed concerns over the distressed newspaper industry and the 
73 Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2010).
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consequences for quality journalism: “I am concerned that if the direction of the news is all  
blogosphere, all opinions, with no serious fact-checking, no serious attempts to put stories in  
context, that what you will end getting is people shouting at each other across the void but not a lot  
of mutual understanding.".74
The tougher market conditions facing online news sites are by many seen as harmful for the 
quality of the news content supplied online, and it seems as though many people find that the quality 
of printed newspapers exceed the quality of its online counterpart. According to a survey conducted 
by the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2009), printed newspapers are 
perceived as more credible news sources compared to digital news outlets by the U.S. public. The 
survey from 2010 shows that 57% news executives believe that the Internet are changing the 
fundamental values of journalism rather than transferring those values online and 51% believe that 
journalism is heading in the “wrong direction”. One of their biggest concerns is loosening standards 
on accuracy and verification. The same picture emerges in Norway. According to Ottosen and 
Krumsvik (2010), 17% (on average) of the readers perceived the online newspaper edition inferior 
to the printed edition and 56% of the journalists in the survey had the same opinion. 
Particularly the new competition facing newspapers from blogs and news aggregators 
generated by the birth of the Internet have been blamed for the hardships of the industry. Some 
newspaper editors have argued that bloggers and news aggregators are “stealing” content from 
newspapers and that they unfairly reap some of the advertising profits that should have gone to the 
news outlets.75 The managing editor of the Wall Street Journal, Robert Thomson, said in an 2009 
interview with The Australian that “There is a collective consciousness among content creators that  
they are bearing the costs and that others are reaping some of the revenues..”. He continued by 
stating that “There is no doubt that certain websites are best described as parasites or tech 
tapeworms in the intestines of the Internet...”.76 
As mentioned in section 2.4, there is a high degree of consensus that quality news needs to 
be of social, political or cultural significance, and that the higher ratio of self-produced content to 
purchased material, the higher ratio of editorial material to advertising, the use of multiple sources, 
74  “Obama concerned about newspapers”, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 20, 2012: http://old.post-
gazette.com/pg/09263/999253-482.stm, accessed March 23, 2012.
75 “Google may lose WSJ, other News Corp. sites”, CNET, November 9, 2009: http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-
10393209-261.html, accessed February 25, 2012.
76 “Google dubbed internet parasite by WSJ editor”, The Australian, April 6, 2009: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/media/google-dubbed-internet-parasite/story-e6frg996-1225696931547, accessed 
February 25, 2012.
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and coverage of local news are important factors in quality journalism. Of course, the utilization of 
these criteria in the making of news content depends heavily on the people that are creating the 
newspaper content, i.e., the journalists. Naturally, quality is heavily dependent on journalists and the 
environment that they work in. The environment that online journalists work in is very different 
from the environment that “traditional” journalists work in. This is naturally connected to the market 
conditions that the newspaper companies are facing online.
As mentioned earlier, the competition for readers' “eyeballs” is tough online. Readers switch 
between different outlets and/or combine them, and the need to catch readers' attention in order to 
haul in more ad dollars places a high pressure on online journalists to continuously produce new and 
“fresh” material that does not come off as “old news” in the eyes of the readers. The fresher the 
content, the more likely it is that the content has not been read before on another online outlet, and 
the more likely it is that the newspapers are able to capitalize of the content in terms of “clicks” and 
hence ad dollars.77 Because material online is easy to “snatch” by online competitors, online 
journalists have a higher pressure on them to produce a high quantity of news articles compared to 
journalists working in the print sector. The increased pressure of productivity and immediacy online 
may be one of the reasons why news content online is perceived as inferior to content offered in 
printed newspapers. The expectations of delivering a high quantity of news content put a heavy time 
pressure on the journalists that may hurt the quality of the content they produce. 
Media observers have noticed that several of the journalistic ideals and fundamental values 
of journalism such as covering a diversity of topics, use of multiple sources, and self-production, 
have come under pressure in the Internet age.78 The need for immediacy in online reporting may 
come at the price of a lower degree of accuracy as journalists online may be more focused on 
“getting the news out” before checking its accuracy. Tightly connected to this is the use of multiple 
sources. As the journalists face a greater time pressure due to the expectation of high productivity, 
journalists may choose to include and inquire less sources in order to increase the amount of articles 
produced in the course of a day. According to Ottosen and Krumsvik (2010), 75% of the respondents 
in their research project stated that they use fewer sources than they want to use,79 and 73% believe 
that the requirement for high quantity weakens the quality of the editorial material. 
In January 2011, the need for immediacy became clear when Agderposten posted a news 
77 Many newspapers have a performance-based pricing on advertising online; the advertisers pay per view or “hits”. 
Hence, the newspaper gets payed each time the article is viewed (CPI), or per thousand views (CPM).
78 Ottosen and Krumsvik (2010), p. 22.
79 The respondents consisted of mostly journalists.
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article online that was false, but that was picked up by several large newspapers such as Aftenposten 
and VG, which had not verified the facts stated by the originator.80
Another noticeable trend online is the increase of copy-paste journalism.81 It can be argued 
that it is easier to generate page views online without investing in journalism.82 Of the top-20 online 
news sources in 2011, seven were either pure aggregators or hybrids.83 Quality content is often 
costly to produce. A newspaper may work up a story that may take weeks to research and write, 
however, as it is published online, it may or may not end up as a top link in the search engine results 
(the links that are listed at the top of the search engine results receive the most hits, and therefore 
more advertising revenues). At the same time, other sites may summarize, link, copy, or comment on 
the original reporting and generate page views and advertising revenues. Because information is 
time-sensitive, immediate copying of the originators content may constitute free-riding. The 
originator bears the costs of news production while the “copycat” can reap some of the benefits in 
form of advertising revenues of the news production that should have gone to the originator because 
the news offered by the copycat directly competes with the news offered by the originator. Hence, 
the incentives to invest in original reporting diminishes as the competition from other news outlets, 
news aggregators, and blogs increases, as it becomes more difficult for the news companies to 
capture enough ad dollars to fund the creation of original material. 
The problem with the increased trend of copying others' material instead of self-producing is 
that news content online becomes homogenous and indistinctive, which hurts diversity in the 
representation of issues, opinions, and ideas. As more newspapers online use the same wire services, 
the differentiation between the different newspaper companies becomes smaller, which may hurt 
diversity in both content and opinions. In a study conducted by Paterson (2006) it was found that 
when it comes to international news online, almost all the original reporting comes from a handful 
of news agencies (Reuters, AP, AFP and BBC), while some newspapers do a little international 
reporting themselves (CNN, MSN, New York Times, Guardian and a few other large newspapers), 
while most newspapers do no original reporting on international news. A preliminary report by the 
university college in Volda (in Norwegian: Høyskolen i Volda) to Mediestøtteutvalget (media 
80 “Feilaktig Amelie-sak gikk landet rundt”, Journalisten.no, January 19, 2011: http://www.journalisten.no/story/63747, 
accessed March 23, 2012.
81 Steensen (2009), p. 13. There are several ways to “copy“ news. Examples are (free) illegal copying that violates the 
“fair use rule” (e.g. by copying an whole article), or to take the story and rewriting it to give it another spin, or by 
obtaining the right to post an article made by another outlet by paying a syndication fee.
82 Federal Communications Commission (2011), p. 130.
83 Ibid., p. 130. A news aggregation site is a site that draws viewers by summarizing news covered by news outlets and 
posting links to content on other sites. A hybrid is a site which combine aggregation and original reporting. 
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support committee), which was appointed by the Norwegian government, showed that online news 
sites have a higher number of articles posted on the websites compared to its offline counterparts, 
and that one of the reasons for this can be attributed to “recycling” of news, and short citations of 
news agency content and other online news sites.84 
The media and the newspapers have a huge influence on which issues that receive attention 
from both the public and governments, and the media has the ability to create publicity around 
causes they perceive as important. A worry in face of the increased use of wire services and “copy-
paste journalism” is that online news reporting will be characterized by a few powerful news 
agencies and newspaper companies dictating the political and social agenda.
Media observers and scholars are also noticing a trend among editors to skew their content 
towards commercial ends, instead of maintaining the newspapers' more idealistic roles in 
democracy.85 Because newspapers are highly dependent on revenues from advertising online, news 
sites are increasingly shifting their editorial material away from small-reach news, to more mass 
appealing or eye-catching material such as titles about sex, celebrities, crime, scandals or national 
and international news, in order to increase their advertising revenues by attracting more viewers or 
“hits”.86 This shift may compromise the newspapers' role as a reliable and trustworthy information 
source, and hurt the diversity of media as some topics might only get minimum coverage or no 
coverage at all.  
Of course the supply of quality content may also depend on the profitability of the newspaper 
or news outlet, and not merely on the market conditions facing news providers. The production of 
quality content requires dedication of time and money as it often entails traveling, information 
gathering and interviewing of news sources. As the newspaper industry is experiencing lower 
profitability and layoffs of journalists, the newspaper companies can no longer afford to maintain the 
same standards of the content they deliver as they must cut down on the production costs. Hence, it 
is likely that the lower the profitability of the newspapers, the harder it becomes for the journalists 
and news providers to fulfill their roles as a “watchdog” and an accurate and trustworthy 
information source in a satisfactory way. In this regard, the Norwegian press subsidies may have 
acted as a “buffer” for the newspaper industry when the Internet was introduced because the 
government support to some extent alleviate the newspaper companies' concern for profit-making by 
84 NOU (2010: 14), p. 61.
85 Picard (2004), p. 55.
86 Patterson (2000), p. 6; Baum (2002), p. 92; Ottosen and Krumsvik (2010), p. 22.
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making the companies less dependent on advertising revenues compared to the U.S. companies. In 
addition, there seems to be a strong tradition in Norway to read printed newspapers and so printed 
newspapers are in a stronger position in Norway compared to the U.S. For these reasons, the effect 
on quality of the Internet may be less severe in Norway compared to in the U.S. 
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3. A theoretical model
In order to given an economic analysis of the impact of Internet on the quality of newspaper content, 
I apply a model by Armstrong and Weeds (2007) which originally is used to compare pay-TV and 
advertising funded TV, where quality programs are assumed costly to produce. The more it costs, the 
higher the quality is. I choose to interpret the model in light of the newspaper industry and 
investigate how profits and quality may differ between non-free newspapers (printed) and free 
newspapers (online). 
In the next section I will introduce the main assumptions in the model and the basic model 
set up. In section 3.2, I look at the equilibrium outcomes when the newspapers are priced (non-free). 
The equilibrium outcomes when newspapers are free, are derived in section 3.3. I will compare the 
outcomes in the two funding regimes to the social optimum in section 3.4. In section 3.5, I will look 
at the effect on the equilibrium outcomes in the two funding regimes when there is more 
competition. 
3.1. Model set up
We assume that there are two newspaper companies, A and B, each offering one newspaper to the 
readers. Further assume that there is an exogenous level of differentiation between the two 
newspapers, meaning that the readers do not rank the newspapers equally. Given a price, some 
prefer the newspaper owned by company A, while others prefer the newspaper owned by company 
B.87 
The companies offer the readers utility, ui, where i = A, B, which is identical for each reader. 
The individual preferences of the readers are captured by introducing a stochastic variable ω, which 
we assume is uniformly distributed between -t and t; ω ~ U[-t , t]. The larger the t, the more 
heterogeneous is the readers' preferences. Moreover, ω > 0 (< 0) represents preferences in favor of 
newspaper A (newspaper B). 
This is a Hotelling's model of spatial competition where the newspapers are horizontally 
differentiated. You can imagine that the readers are uniformly distributed along a line segment that 
stretches between -t and t, with the newspapers located at the two endpoints, as illustrated in figure 
87 I will from now and on refer to the newspaper owned by company A as newspaper A and the newspaper owned by 
company B as newspaper B. 
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11.
Figure 11: Distribution of readers and location of the  
newspapers
The t is often interpreted as the degree of differentiation between the newspapers. When t is small, 
the differentiation between the two newspapers is small, and when t is high, the differentiation 
between the two newspapers is large. Alternatively, t can be interpreted as the newspaper companies' 
market power. If there is little differentiation between the newspapers, the utilities the newspapers 
offer are highly critical for the readers' choices, and if there is high differentiation, the decisions of 
the readers will depend more on each of the readers' personal preferences. A reader that is indifferent 
between the two newspapers is located at 0, and will choose solely based on the utilities offered by 
the two newspapers.
A reader will choose newspaper A if the sum of the utility and the personal preference for 
newspaper A is higher than the utility obtained from choosing newspaper B:
(3.1) u A−uB0
We see that the higher the ω, the more probable it is for this to hold.
The market share of the company that distributes newspaper A, sA, is the probability that 
(3.1) is true:
(3.2) sA=Pr u A−uB0⇔ Pr −u A−uB⇔Pr uA−uB
where the last expression comes from the symmetry of the uniform distribution around the zero 
mean. Newspaper A's market share is illustrated in figure 12.
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Figure 12:  Market share of newspaper A
Calculation of the shaded area in figure 12 gives us the expression for the market share of newspaper 
A
(3.3) sA = [uA−uB−−t ]∗
1
2t
=
tuA−uB
2t
= 1
2

u A−uB
2t
The market share of newspaper B is then the remaining area; sB = 1−sA =
1
2

uB−uA
2t
.
We assume that the readers' utility of newspaper i depends on three variables:
(3.4) u i=vi− ni−p i , i = A, B
where vi is the (endogenous) quality of the newspaper content, ni is the number of ads in the 
newspaper, δ is the degree of perceived nuisance of the ads to the readers88, and pi is the price on the 
newspaper (if there is a price). As seen from (3.4), the utility of the reader is increasing in content 
quality and decreasing in advertisements and price.
We further assume that the advertising revenues that accrue to the newspaper companies are 
88 Many have argued that newspaper ad nuisance to the readers is low, or that it can even be positive. See e.g. Rysman 
(2009) and Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005). Advertisement is in many cases clearly a nuisance to television 
watchers, as the TV-commercials interrupts and disturbs the program the viewer is watching. However this may not 
be case for newspaper readers as they may just skip the advertisement or even find some of them enjoying and 
helpful (especially classifieds). 
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increasing in the readership of their newspapers. That is, for an advertising level, ni, newspaper 
company i receives R(ni) in advertising revenues per reader, where we assume that R(●) is a concave 
function, and that this function is equal for both newspaper companies. The assumption about 
concavity of the advertising revenue function comes from the presumption that ads are more 
valuable to the advertisers when there are fewer ads in total; the chance that the reader is impressed 
by the advertisement is higher when there are fewer ads compared to when there are many ads and 
each ad is likely to get less attention from the readers.  
Suppose that the only cost of the newspaper company is related to the quality of the 
newspaper's content and that the cost does not depend on the number of readers
(3.5) c v i=
 v i
2
2
The cost function is assumed to be equal for the two companies (γ is the same). 
We can now express the profit function for newspaper i as
(3.6) i=si pisi Rni−
 v i
2
2
where the first term is total revenues from newspaper sales and the second term is total advertising 
revenues.
By inserting (3.4) in the market shares, and by inserting this in (3.6), we can express the 
profit function as
(3.7) i=[
1
2

v i− ni− pi−v j− n j− p j
2t
] p iR ni−
 v i
2
2
where vj denotes the rival's newspaper quality, nj denotes the rival's level of advertising, and pj is the 
rival's newspaper price or subscription fee (e.g. if i = A, then j = B).
In the following sections I will derive the equilibrium levels of advertising and quality in two 
different funding regimes. I will start with the case where we assume that the newspapers are funded 
with both advertising revenues and revenues from single-copy sales or subscription fees, which I 
interpret as the case of printed newspapers. 
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3.2. Case 1: Mixed funding regime 
We use the framework presented above to look at the equilibrium outcomes in the case where the 
newspaper companies can charge the readers for their newspapers. As mentioned, most printed 
newspapers have a large market share in their respective market, so the duopoly framework is 
fitting.89
The newspaper companies have three choice variables, and we assume that the companies' 
choices are made simultaneously. They need to decide on the price on the paper, the advertising 
level in the newspaper, and the quality of their content. Let us start by looking at the optimal choices 
of advertising levels in the two newspapers. By solving for the pi in (3.4) and inserting it in (3.7), we 
get the following expression of newspaper i's profit as a function of utilities and advertising levels:
(3.8) i=[
1
2

u i−u j
2t
]vi−uiRni− ni−
 v i
2
2
To ensure a market sharing equilibrium, meaning that both newspaper companies have positive 
profits, we assume that 
(3.9) ≥
1
4t
By deriving the first order condition of (3.8) with respect to ni, we find the condition for the 
equilibrium level of advertising 
(3.10) R ' ni=
The equilibrium level of quality, vi, is found in a similar manner
(3.11) v i=
s i

The first order condition with respect to pi is
89 This assumption is of course much weaker when we look at newspapers online because of the numerous competitors 
in the digital sphere. 
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(3.12)
tp j− piK
2t
−
 p iR ni
2t
= 0
where K = (vi – vj) + δ(nj – ni). By solving for pi, we find the best response function of newspaper i, 
BRi, or the choice of pi that maximizes newspaper i's profit, given any price choice of the rival 
newspaper j:
(3.13) p i=
tv i−v jn j−ni−Rni
2

p j
2
Because of symmetry, we find the best response function of newspaper j to be:
(3.14) p j=
tv j−v ini−n j−Rn j
2

pi
2
We see that the best response functions are increasing in the rival's price, meaning that the prices are 
strategic complements; if one of the newspapers increases its price, then the optimal strategy of the 
rival is to also increase its price (by one half). 
Because the newspapers are identical in the sense that they have the same advertising 
revenue function and cost function, and we only consider symmetric equilibria, this must imply that 
the newspapers will make the exact same choices regarding advertising levels and quality, and that 
the optimal levels of these variables therefore must be the same for both newspapers. This means 
that vi = vj  = v,  ni = nj = n, and R(ni) = R(nj). The equilibrium newspaper prices are found by 
inserting the best response functions into one another and solving for the prices. This gives us the 
following equilibrium prices
(3.15) p i=t−R ni
(3.16) p j=t−Rn j
Because ni = nj = n, this means that the newspapers will set the same price. It comes as no surprise 
that the prices are increasing in t; the more market power the newspapers have, the higher prices 
they are able to set (without losing all its readers). The equilibrium price is such that, given the price 
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choice of your rival, you would not change your own price (i.e. a Nash equilibrium). Hence, the 
equilibrium is characterized by the intersection of the two newspapers' best response functions. This 
is illustrated in figure 13.
Figure 13: Illustration of equilibrium point, best response  
functions, and equilibrium prices
To ensure that the prices are positive, we assume that in equilibrium n is such that t > R(n) holds. 
The symmetric equilibrium also means that the newspapers get half of the market of readers 
each (this is easily seen from (3.4) as the utilities the newspapers offer will be the same).
We have identified the symmetric equilibrium outcomes of three variables in case 1, where 
the newspapers are funded by both single-copy sales and advertising revenues:
(3.17) R ' n1=
(3.18) v1=
1
2 
      
(3.19) p1=t−R n1
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Newspaper profit, given the equilibrium price, market share and content quality, is then 
(3.20) 1=s1 p2Rn1−
 v1
2
2
=1
2
[ t−R niRni]−

2
[ 1
2 
]
2
=1
2
t− 1
8
where the profit is increasing in t and decreasing in the cost variable, γ. 
Industry profit is then easily calculated as
(3.21)  industry=
1
2
t1
2
t−2 1
8
= t− 1
4
In this case, industry profits are explained only by the level of differentiation and the cost of quality.
3.3. Case 2: Advertising funding regime
In this section we will characterize the equilibrium outcomes when the newspaper companies do not 
charge their readers. This could for instance represent online newspapers, as these in most cases are 
free of charge.90
We stick to the framework presented in section 3.1, except that pi = 0. As in section 3.2., the 
equilibrium outcomes will be symmetric. With pi = 0, the newspaper profit function becomes
(3.22) i=[
1
2

u i−u j
2t
]Rn i−
 vi
2
2
where ui = vi – δni. 
The newspaper must choose the optimal level of advertisement and the quality of their online 
content. We write out the expression for profit:
(3.23) i=[
tv i− ni−v j− n j
2t
]Rni−
 v i
2
2
The equilibrium ad level must fulfill the first order condition of (3.23) with respect to ni:
(3.24)
∂ i
∂ ni
=0 ⇔ [
tv i−v j n j−n i
2t
]R' ni−
 R ni
2t
=0
90 Of course, the duopoly framework does not fit very well with the competitive environment of digital news sites. In 
section 6.5, we look at the outcome when competition toughens. 
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As before, vi = vj = v, and ni = nj = n. The symmetric equilibrium ad level in case 2, n2, must 
therefore fulfill the following expression
(3.25)
R' n2
Rn2
=
t
The equilibrium level of quality must fulfill the following first order condition
(3.26)
∂i
∂ v i
=0 ⇔
R ni
2t
−vi=0
The symmetric equilibrium level of content quality on online news outlets, v2, is therefore given by:
(3.27) v2=
R n2
2t
Because ui = uj = u, the market share for each of the newspapers is still one half. 
Profit in equilibrium in the case of online news outlets is then
(3.28) 2=
1
2
Rn2−
1
2
v2
2=1
2
Rn2−

2

R n2
2t

2
=1
2
Rn2−
R n2
2
8  t 2
The break-even condition for the newspapers, or the condition to ensure a market sharing 
equilibrium, is satisfied if
(3.29) 1
2
R n2−
Rn2
2
8 t 2
0 ⇔ 4  t 2R n2 ⇔ 4  t
Rn2
t
Industry profit is then
(3.30) 2∗2=R n2−
Rn2
2
4  t 2
=R n2[1−
Rn2
4  t 2
]
which in this case also dependens on the R(●) function.
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3.4.  Regime comparison
3.4.1. Quality and advertising levels
We want to compare the equilibrium outcomes in the two funding regimes. First of all, the level of 
advertisement will be lower in a printed paper compared to on an online news site. To make (3.17) 
and (3.25) comparable, we divide (3.17) by R(n1):
(3.17')
R' n1
Rn1
= 
Rn1
We assumed in section 3.2. that t > R(n1). This means that
(3.31)
R' n1
Rn1
= 
Rn1
 
t
=
R' n2
Rn2
⇔
R' n1
Rn1

R ' n2
Rn2
Because R(●) is a concave function, this must imply that n1 has to be less than n2. 
These results also demonstrates that t > R(n2). Because n2 > n1, it follows that R'(n2) < R'(n1) 
= δ. From (3.25) we can deduce that, because R'(n2) < δ, t must be larger than R(n2) for (3.25) to 
hold. 
Because we have determined that t > R(n2), this means that the right hand side of the last 
expression in (3.29) is less than 1. Hence, a sufficient condition for positive profits under the 
advertising funding regime is that 4γt > 1, which is the same condition for newspapers to break-even 
in the printed market. This implies that as long as it is profitable with printed newspapers, it will also 
be profitable with online newspapers.
When going from a mixed funding regime to a regime where the paper is purely funded by 
advertising, quality will decrease. This follows from the assumption that t > R(n2):
(3.32) Rn2t ⇒
Rn2
t
1 ⇒ v2=
Rn2
2t 
 1
2 
=v1
We have characterized two main differences between the two funding regimes. The fact that 
advertising levels are higher when the newspapers are funded only by advertising should not come 
as a surprise. The higher quality level in paid papers is a consequence of the fact that when the 
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newspaper companies are able to charge for their papers, they are able to extract some of the readers' 
surplus by raising the price on their paper following an increase in quality. This is because the 
readers' willingness to pay for the paper increases in quality.   
3.4.2. Social optimum
I will now compare the level of quality and advertising in the two funding regimes to the socially 
optimal levels of these variables. Social efficiency refers to the optimal distribution of resources in a 
society, or the optimal output of a good, taking into account all external costs and benefits, as well as 
internal costs and benefits. It's a situation where the marginal social benefit (MSB) is equal to the 
marginal social cost (MSC). 
The social benefit is the sum of two benefits; the benefit to the agent who is performing the 
action (which in this case is the newspapers), and the benefit accruing from the production to a 
different party than the one that is producing the product (which in this case is the readers). Because 
the advertisers' utility or profit function is not included in this theoretical model, we can not 
determine the effect on the utilities or profits of the advertisers of news production.
The social cost is defined in a similar matter. It's the sum of two costs; the cost of the agent 
who is performing the action (newspapers), and the cost imposed on a different party than the one 
that is performing the action (readers). 
Let's start by finding the socially optimal level of content quality. We want to find the quality 
level that maximizes social benefit minus social cost:
(3.33) max v v−
1
2
 v2−1
2
 v2 ⇔ v= 1
2 
This result shows us that the quality provision under the mixed funding regime is equal to the 
social optimal level of quality, and that the quality provision under the advertising funding regime is 
too low (because v2 < v1) seen from a social stance. This means that when newspapers are funded 
both from advertising and single-copy sales, the social and private incentives to provide quality 
coincide. 
We do the same for advertising levels. We want to find the advertising level that maximizes 
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(3.34) maxni , n j Rn iRn j−ni−n j ⇔ R' ni= and Rn j=
Again we see that under the mixed funding regime, advertising levels coincide with the advertising 
levels that are socially optimal, and that the advertising levels under the advertising funding regime 
are too high (because n2 > n1). 
3.4.3. Reader surplus 
From a social stance the mixed funding regime is preferable as the equilibrium outcomes coincide 
with the social optimum. However, the social optimum may not be preferred by the readers. The 
readers prefer high quality, low advertising levels, and low prices. When the two funding regimes 
are different, in the sense that t > R(n1), and quality is fixed, Armstrong and Weeds (2007) show that 
the utility of the free newspaper will always be higher than the utility of the paid newspaper. This 
means that the disutility of more advertisement in the free paper is outweighed by the utility increase 
you get from the fact that you do not have to pay for the news. 
When quality is endogenous, on the other hand, these preferences might switch. This can be 
shown if we assume that the advertising revenue function is linear, R(n) = αn, with α < δ. Utility in 
the mixed funding regime is then equal to
(3.35) u1=
1
2 
−t
Equilibrium advertising and quality levels in the advertising funded newspaper are in this 
example equal to
(3.36) n2=
t

(3.37) v2=

2 
With these values, utility becomes
40
(3.38) u2=

2
−t
We have that α < δ. This implies that u1 > u2. Hence, if it is difficult to affect the quality of 
the newspaper, then the readers surplus will be higher in a mixed funding regime than in an 
advertising funding regime. If the newspapers can affect the quality level of their newspapers, reader 
welfare may, or may not, be higher when newspapers are not free of charge. 
3.5. Using comparative statistics to measure the impact of more 
competition
One of the most important structural changes for newspapers in the digital era, is the increase in 
competition the newspapers now are facing. Online news sites compete with hundreds of other news 
sites, bloggers, and news aggregators.
In this section, we will look at the effects on the equilibrium outcomes in the two funding 
regimes, with special emphasis on quality, when the newspapers find themselves in a tougher 
competitive environment.  
It is usual to refer to t as the degree of competition in the market. When t decreases, there is 
less differentiation between the two newspapers, which increases the substitutability between the 
two papers and intensifies competition. 
3.5.1. Effect of more competition in case 1
We introduce tougher competition by letting t decrease and look at what happens with the 
equilibrium outcomes when the newspapers face tougher competition in the market. In fact, tougher 
competition has no impact on the equilibrium level of advertising and quality, as we can see from 
(3.17) and (3.18). However, it does have a negative effect on the equilibrium prices, which should 
not come as a surprise:
(3.39)
−∂ p1
∂ t
=−10
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There are two effects of tougher competition on quality. On the one hand, more competition 
has a direct effect on the incentives to supply high quality news as to attract more readers (remember 
that utility depends positively on quality). On the other hand, more competition has an indirect effect 
on newspapers' incentives because it reduces the price-cost margin of the newspaper,91 which in turn 
reduces the newspapers' incentive to invest in quality. In case 1, these two effects cancel each other 
out, and there is no effect on the quality. 
3.5.2. Effect of more competition in case 2
We introduce competition in the case where the newspapers are not charging for their news. This 
represents the online news industry, in which news are free and competition is fierce. The claims 
that news quality online is far below news quality in printed newspapers due to the rough 
competitive environment online are being explored in this section. 
In the case where newspapers are fully funded by advertising revenues, more competition 
has an effect on both on the equilibrium level of advertising and equilibrium level of quality. The 
effect on the level of advertising is shown to be negative:
(3.40)
−dn2
dt
=
− Rn2
t R ' ' n2−R ' n2
 0
When the newspapers enjoy high market power, they are able to set advertising levels (and prices, if 
there are positive prices) according to their own economic interest. However, as competition 
increases, the newspapers lose market power and must to a greater extent consider the readers' 
preferences when deciding on advertising levels (and prices) in order not to lose the readers to their 
rival. Because we have assumed that readers dislike advertising, the equilibrium level of advertising 
therefore decreases when competition toughens. 
The effect on quality of more competition is found to be positive:
(3.41)
−∂ v2
∂ t
=
Rn2
2  t 2
 0
91 Price-cost margin= p−marginal costp
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This theoretical result differs from the main point in section 2.5.3, i.e., that competition online hurts 
quality. However, in light of this model the result is actually not surprising. Given the fact that we 
have only considered a symmetric equilibrium, more intense competition will only have a direct 
effect on the newspaper's incentive to supply quality content. This is is due to the fact that prices are 
zero, so more competition will have no impact on the price-cost margin of the newspaper. Hence, 
because they are not able to lower their prices, they must increase quality in order to attract more 
readers. 
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4. Discussion
We have found that under the mixed funding regime, both the level of quality and advertising 
coincide with the socially optimal levels, and that under the advertising funding regime the level of 
advertising is too high and quality is too low in relation to what's socially optimal. This is because 
the newspapers are not able to capture any reader surplus following an increase in quality since they 
are not able to raise their prices. Hence, the newspapers' incentives to increase quality are low. In a 
simple way the model captures the notion that the quality of news online is lower than the quality of 
news offline.
However, we found that, contrary to the perception of most readers, editors and journalists,92 
quality actually increases with more competition when the newspapers are free. When competition 
becomes more fierce, quality and advertising levels converge towards the levels that are socially 
optimal. This does not concur with the fact that people have become more skeptical of online news 
over the years. 
There are some important attributes of the Internet that this model does not capture and that 
may change the results derived in section 3.5. In the following section I will discuss some of the 
limitations of the model and how the results derived in the model may change as we change some of 
the assumptions we have made. Thereafter, I will include a small discussion about the relationship 
between competition and diversity. 
4.1. Limitations and extensions
One important aspect that the model does not capture is the change in reading habits in the wake of 
the digital era. The model we have applied assumes that readers only consume one newspaper. 
While this is most often the case when the newspapers have a positive price (most people only buy 
or subscribe to one newspaper), it does not describe online behavior very well. Online behavior is 
characterizes by multi-homing, which means that consumers make use of several news outlets and 
not only one. In a more casual terminology it means that readers often visit several news sites and 
are seldom loyal to any one newspaper because it is not costly (in monetary terms) to consume more 
than one paper.
92 See quantitative research from Ottosen and Krumsvik (2010), pp. 20-21 and Pew Research Center's Project for 
Excellence in Journalism (2009).
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In a more realistic model you might interpret a reduction in t as an increase in the likelihood that 
readers will multi-home because the substitability between the two newspapers increases as the 
horizontal differentiation between the newspapers decreases. When the readers are multi-homing, it 
is reasonable to imagine that they spend less time on any outlet compared to when they only use one 
outlet. When readers spend less time on each outlet, the probability that each reader is “impressed” 
by the advertisement is most likely lower compared to offline where most readers consume only one 
newspaper. It can therefore be argued that in the case where t represents the likelihood of multi-
homing, the advertising revenue function of the newspapers, R(●), might be negatively affected by 
increased competition. Hence, quality might be negatively affected by more competition online 
because 
∂ v2
∂−R
0 .This is seen from (3.27). 
In the applied model, the advertising revenue function is identical in the two cases. However, 
it may be closer to reality to assume that revenues per advertisement is higher whenever the 
newspaper is paid for compared to when it's free. This is related to the concept that people tend to 
value things more when they pay a higher price for it.93 In the case of newspapers, this may involve 
spending more time on the newspaper and browse the newspaper more than once. When the 
newspaper is free, on the other hand, there are no monetary costs involved in the consumption of 
news. Throwing away a free newspaper, or leaving a free news site without having read through all 
the content, does not amount to a utility loss. Hence, when the newspaper is paid for, the reader 
signals an interest in the newspaper's content as he is willing to pay a price for it, and expects that 
the utility acquired by reading the paper at least exceeds the monetary cost. This suggests that the 
average reader spends more time reading a paper that is paid for relative to a paper that can be 
obtained for free. This implies that advertisements are more valuable in a priced paper compared to 
in a free paper, which would imply that dR/dp > 0. If this is the case, then content quality online will 
be lower than predicted in the model.
Up until now, we have only discussed the effect of competition on free news, or as I have 
interpreted it, on digital news. However, it is fair to assume that the access of free news online will 
also have an effect on news offline. If free online news are “cannibalizing” print sales, which some 
studies have suggested it in fact does,94 then printed newspaper may lose readers to digital platforms, 
93 See the interview with Dan Ariely, a behavioral economist at MIT, in The News York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/health/19iht-ariel.1.11252785.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all, accessed March  11, 
2012. 
94 See e.g. Gentzkow (2007) for empirical evidence that online news sites are cannibalizing sales of printed 
45
and both sales revenues and advertising revenues will fall, and competition from online platforms 
may have a negative effect on the quality of printed newspapers. 
We saw in section 3.4.2 that the quality level offline coincides with the social optimum while 
the quality level online is too low. News production entails positive externalities, as discussed in 
section 2.4, which we have not accounted for in the welfare analysis. This may suggest that the 
quality levels in both funding regimes are too low relative to the social optimum. However, due to 
the fact that the newspaper companies are able to set a positive price on the their newspaper in the 
mixed funding regime, quality will always be higher in the mixed funding regime compared to in the 
pure advertising funding regime. 
4.2. Diversity 
In the model above we assumed that the newspaper “profile” is fixed,95 and we showed that 
competition has a negative effect on quality when the newspaper is purely funded by advertising. 
However, it is interesting to discuss to what degree the newspapers will differentiate themselves 
from their rival when they have the opportunity to choose the degree of differentiation themselves.96 
In other words, we will discuss the degree of diversity when the newspapers can choose their own 
profiles. 
The term “diversity” can at times be unclear. In the following I will define diversity as a 
great variety of product variants and that the consumers differ in their opinions as to which variant is 
the best or most preferable. I will not base this section on mathematical derivations, but rather on an 
intuitive and illustrative explanation of the different diversity outcomes in the different funding 
regimes. I will also investigate how diversity may be affected by more competition in different 
funding regimes. The following sections are to a large extent based on the simple explanations by 
Kind and Møen (2011).
We still use the Hotelling-model framework with two newspapers, uniformly distributed 
readers, and we still assume that advertising revenues are increasing in the newspapers' readership. 
However, we now assume that quality is exogenously given. They can differentiate themselves by 
choosing a specific political profile or choose to focus on a specific genre or news topic. We assume 
newspapers.
95 We assumed that the newspapers were located at each end of the Hotelling line.
96 In this model this means that they can choose their location on the Hotelling line.
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that some readers like newspapers with a clear profile, while other like a more neutral newspaper (in 
figure 14, those readers are positioned around M). 
Let us assume that each of the newspapers need to choose a political profile, and that 
newspaper A's initial location is profile l (moderate left), and newspaper B's initial location is profile 
r (moderate right), as shown in figure 14: 
Figure 14: Political profile
All the readers to the left of M, will prefer and choose newspaper A because this profile suits their 
political stance better than newspaper B, and the readers to the right of M, will prefer and choose 
newspaper B. The endpoints represents an extreme left- or rightwing political profile of the 
newspapers.
The question we can ask here is whether these choices are optimal or not, and if not, what are 
the optimal choices of the newspapers? Where on the Hotelling line should they locate themselves? 
The answers to these questions depends on the newspapers' funding regimes.  
4.2.1.  Advertising funding regime
In the case where advertising revenues are the newspapers' only source of income, the newspapers 
want to choose the political profile that maximizes the number of readers as this maximizes total 
advertising revenues. Looking at the figure above, it is clear that the choice of profiles, l and r, is not 
optimal for the newspapers. 
From newspaper A's position, we see that the optimal strategy is to position the paper a little 
bit to the left of r. In that way, newspaper A captures a much larger share of the market and hence 
receives more in advertising revenues. The same is true for newspaper B; he wants to position 
himself a little to the right of r in order to attract more readers. The equilibrium outcome will be 
such that the newspapers choose (almost) the exact same profiles, or they choose to differentiate 
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themselves as little as possible from the rival newspaper. In the eyes of the readers, the newspapers 
are exactly the same, and the newspapers get half of the market of readers each. 
Figure 15: Equilibrium outcome (principle of minimum differentiation)
The equilibrium choice of profile is also known as the principle of minimum differentiation. When 
the newspapers do not compete in prices, they go “where the demand is”, which in this case is in the 
middle. This captures what we discussed in section 2.4.3, i.e., that newspapers tend to shift their 
editorial material to more mass appealing material. This amount of differentiation is usually too low 
seen from an efficiency stance.97 
If we relax the assumption on exogenous quality levels, the intuition from the theoretical 
model in part 3 tells us that as the newspapers move towards the middle in an attempt to capture a 
larger share of the readers, the newspapers will increase quality as a response to tougher competition 
for readers. If the newspapers choose a higher degree of differentiation, competition for readers is 
relaxed, and it will be optimal to invest less in quality. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a 
trade-off between diversity and quality in an advertising funding regime.
4.2.2. Purely subscription funded
Let us now assume that the newspapers are purely funded by subscription fees or single-copy sales. 
Further assume that the newspapers choose the same profile, as in the case above. In this case, the 
newspapers are exactly equal in the eyes of the readers, and they will choose the paper that has the 
lowest price. Hence, in an attempt to capture the whole market, the rival newspapers will engage in 
a simultaneous price war, and the newspapers will end up setting prices equal to marginal costs. This 
is known as the Bertrand paradox. To avoid this and relax the price competition, the newspapers will 
choose a higher degree of differentiation. 
97 Kind and Møen (2011), p. 10.
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There are two opposing effects at work in this case. By getting closer to your rival, you 
capture a larger share of the readers, but by moving away from your rival, you relax price 
competition. When the newspapers are deciding on their profile, these two effects are taken into 
account. In an extreme case, the newspapers would want to locate themselves at each of the 
endpoints and we would have full differentiation of the newspapers. This is known as the principle 
of maximum differentiation. 
In the case where newspapers are funded by both subscription fees/single-copy sales and 
advertising, the equilibrium outcome could either be too little or too much differentiation compared 
to the social optimum. This depends on the specific newspaper structure (production function, cost 
function, demand function etc.). However, the more dependent on advertising revenues the 
newspaper is, the less differentiated it will be, and the more dependent on subscription 
revenues/single copy sales the newspaper is, the more differentiated it will be.98 
The experience of both the Norwegian and the American industry of disaffiliating themselves 
from political parties have been linked to the increased dependence on advertising revenues over the 
years.99 
4.2.3. Effect of competition
Kind and Møen (2011) argue that in the case where the newspapers are fully funded by advertising, 
diversity tends to be too low, and when the newspapers are fully funded by subscription 
revenues/single copy sales, diversity may be too high.
There has been some concerns regarding the increase in concentration of ownership in the 
newspaper industry, which has characterized the development in both Norway and in the U.S. High 
concentration of ownership may reduce competition in the newspaper industry, and some fear that 
the lack of competition may undermine the newspapers' role as watchdogs.100
On the other hand, newspaper organizations like Norwegian Schibsted are pushing for higher 
legal ownership limits,101 and in 2009, Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the United States House of 
Representatives, argued that newspapers should be given leniency under anti-trust laws so that they 
98 Kind and Sørgard (2011), p. 37.
99  Kind and Møen (2011), p. 9.
100Kirchhoff (2009), p. 2.
101 “Fusjoner kan styrke mediemangfoldet”, Kampanje, November 30, 2012: 
http://www.kampanje.com/medier/article5827384.ece, accessed March 19, 2012.
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can “find ways to remain viable and pursue their vital democratic role”.102
Higher owner concentration may have two opposing effects. Large companies may run more 
efficiently (due to economies of scale), which may be reflected in lower prices for consumers and 
higher content quality. On the other hand, higher market power may result in higher prices for 
consumers and low incentives for providing high quality content and to invest in innovation.103 
However, because of the two-sidedness of the newspaper market, higher owner concentration is 
unlikely to have the latter effect on prices.
In this section, we will look at the implications of more competition (both in terms of higher 
owner concentration and additional newspapers), and whether or not high market power hurts the 
diversity of the press. 
We saw in section 4.2.1 that under an advertising funding regime with two newspapers, the 
competition for readers will lead to minimum differentiation between the two newspapers. In the 
eyes of the readers the newspapers are equal. This suggests that the diversity online is low. 
Assume now that the two newspapers are under the same ownership. Then the owner wants 
to maximize total readership which translates into minimizing the distance between the newspapers 
and the readers. Hence, when the two newspapers are under the same ownership, the two 
newspapers will serve different preferences instead of trying to steal business from the rival 
newspaper. This implies that higher owner concentration leads to more diversity instead of 
duplication compared to when the two newspapers are competing. A numerical example may make 
this easier to see. 
Assume that there are three groups of readers; one group prefers a neutral paper, the second 
group prefers a left-winged paper, and the third prefers a right-winged paper. Let us assume that 
total audience in each group is 100, 30, and 25, respectively. In the case where the two newspapers 
compete against each other and their only source of income is from advertising revenues, both paper 
will choose the profile of a neutral newspaper, split the market, and get 50 neutral readers each. This 
is the strategy that maximizes the total audience for each newspaper. Assume now that the two 
newspapers are under the same ownership. The owner of the newspapers wants to maximize the 
total audience for both newspapers. Hence, one newspaper will have a neutral profile and win an 
audience of 100, and the other will have a leftist profile and win an audience of 30, which secures 
102 “US House speaker urges easing competition laws for newspapers”, The Guardian, March 17, 2009: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/mar/17/pelosi-newspapers-anti-trust-leniency, accessed March 19, 2012.
103 Kind and Sørgard (2011), pp. 8-14. 
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the owner a total audience of 130. 
Assume now that we add more competition from rival newspapers in the case where 
newspapers are fully advertising funded. Added competition will have a positive effect on diversity 
if the share of audience left unserved is greater than the share of audience obtained by stealing 
business from the other newspapers by choosing the same profile. The more newspapers there are in 
the market, the more likely it is that the optimal strategy is to serve the less popular genres instead of 
duplicating. We can see this from the numerical example above. With two rival newspapers, they 
will split the neutral market and get 50 readers each. If there are three newspapers, they will still 
choose a neutral profile because this gives them around 33 readers each. However, as a fourth 
newspaper enters the market, he can choose the same profile as the other newspapers and take ¼ of 
the market (which is equal to 25 readers) or serve one of the unattended audiences. Because 
choosing a leftist profile gives him 30 readers, he will choose this profile instead of the neutral one. 
According to Kind and Sørgard (2011), the outcome in the case where the newspapers are 
under a mutual owner will correspond to the optimal level of differentiation. However, the benefit of 
concentration of ownership does not apply as easily in the case of a mixed funding regime as in the 
case of an advertising funding regime.104 
We saw in section 3.5.2 that more competition has a positive effect on quality online. 
However, there are some important characteristics to the online market and consumer behavior that 
the model does not capture. The model may therefore not capture the true effects of more 
competition online. The common perception is that competition online hurts quality, and in section 
4.1 I gave examples of some of the limitations in the model. We have also seen that diversity tends 
to be too low online as the newspapers choose a low degree of differentiation in the competition for 
readers. In light of these results, the suggestion by the Norwegian government to extend the press 
subsidies to online news outlets seems reasonable. Digital news outlets have over the years become 
one of the most important news sources. The positive externalities of quality news appear when they 
are consumed by readers, and the more individuals that read quality news, the bigger the ripple 
effects of quality news is. It is therefore important to ensure the quality of online news since many 
consumers of news are replacing their printed newspaper with news outlets online. Support to online 
news outlets will relieve some of the pressure of the newspapers to choose the strategy that 
maximizes readers. When the news outlets become less dependent on advertising revenues they 
104 Kind and Sørgard (2011), p. 38.
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might choose to invest more in quality journalism instead of content that receives “hits” in the short 
run. The less dependent the news outlets are on advertising revenues, the less they need to skew the 
content to match the preferences of the mass audience. 
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5. Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to discuss the impact of the digital revolution on the quality of news 
content, especially on the quality of news delivered online. The possible consequences for quality 
may have important implications because of the important societal and political importance of 
quality journalism and the increased popularity of online news, and should trigger a discussion 
around possible measures to shield the important roles of newspapers, also online. 
In approaching these issues, I have used a spatial competition model with horizontal 
differentiation and compared a mixed funding regime and a pure advertising funding regime as a 
method of comparing offline and online news provision. I find that the level of quality in the mixed 
funding regime (printed newspapers) is higher than the level of quality in the advertising funding 
regime (online newspapers), where quality is assumed costly to produce. This is because higher 
quality can not be capitalized by the newspapers in terms of higher prices to readers. Moreover, the 
model finds that quality is positively affected by more competition (a reduction in the horizontal 
differentiation between the newspapers, t) online because the news outlets' only way to attract 
readers is to increase quality. Offline, there is no effect on quality because the positive and the 
negative effects of competition on the incentives to raise quality cancel each other out. 
There are several assumptions in the model which are unrealistic, and which may make this 
model not fully explain the behavior of news providers, especially online. First of all, the theoretical 
model does not distinguish between differences in reading habits offline and online. The model 
assumes that the readers can only consume one newspaper. While this explains consumption of 
printed newspapers fairly well, it is a poor description of reading behavior online, where reading 
behavior is characterized by multi-homing. In a more realistic model, one might interpret a 
reduction in the horizontal differentiation between the newspapers as an increase in the likelihood of 
multi-homing by the readers. It can be argued that multi-homing decreases the probability that each 
reader is “impressed” by the advertisements because multi-homing most likely reduces the time 
spent on each outlet. If so, more competition will have a negative effect on the advertising revenue 
function of the newspaper, which will have a direct negative impact on the quality online. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the advertising revenue function is not identical offline and 
online, which we have assumed in the theoretical model. It may be more realistic to assume that 
revenues per advertisement is higher offline than online. This is related to the belief that people 
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value goods more when it is paid for compared to when it is free. This suggests that people spend 
more time reading a printed newspaper compared to an online paper. This indicates that 
advertisements are more valuable in a printed paper than in an online paper, which means that 
content quality online will be lower than predicted in the model. 
In addition, I have investigated the implications for diversity in a purely advertising funded 
regime (e.g. online news outlets). In a purely advertising funded regime, with quality being 
exogenously given, newspapers will choose to differentiate themselves as little as possible from the 
rival newspaper in order to attract more readers. Higher owner concentration will have a positive 
effect on diversity as the owner wants to maximize total audience. Adding more competitors may 
also have a positive effect on diversity, and it is more likely the more competitors there are. 
If we relax the assumption on exogenous quality levels, the intuition from the theoretical 
model in part 3 tells us that as the newspapers become more alike in an advertising funding regime, 
newspapers will increase quality as a response to tougher competition for readers. The more similar 
profiles the newspapers choose, the more they have to increase quality. Therefore, it can be argued 
that there might be a trade-off between diversity and quality online.  
The digital revolution has changed the economic foundation of the news providers in a 
profound way and the newspaper industry finds itself in a transition. Technological advances such as 
mobile devices, social media, and online video streaming open up for new sources of revenues for 
newspaper companies that may replace some of the lost revenues in the printed market over time. 
The changing environment in the news industry also opens for new research themes of economic 
importance. Proper understanding of the modern newspaper industry is therefore important in order 
to understand the determinants of quality of news content. 
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